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 Prior research has assumed that financial reporting failures indicate that individual 
directors have provided inferior monitoring of the reporting process and has found that 
directors suffer the loss of board positions following reporting failures.  These penalties, 
however, are not uniformly applied across all outside directors.  Using a sample of firms 
that have experienced multiple reporting failures and a matched sample of non-restating 
firms, I collect information on individual audit committee members and investigate 
whether retention on the audit committee is related to the quality of the director or to the 
influence of the CEO over the board of directors.  I then examine whether the retention of 
directors on the audit committee is related to further aggressive accounting practices and 
to additional negative consequences for investors in the long run.  I find that the retention 
of directors on the audit committee is positively related to the quality of the director and 
negatively related to CEO influence over the board for both the restating and non-
restating sample.  I further find that the retention of directors on the audit committee 
following a reporting failure is not related to future aggressive accounting practices.  Test 
examining other long-term consequences to investors are inconclusive.  Overall, these 
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I.  Introduction 
 This study empirically addresses whether the labor market for directors operates 
in an efficient manner to discipline those members of the audit committee that are 
deemed to have, theoretically, provided inferior monitoring of the financial reporting 
process and whether the retention of such members of the audit committee is associated 
with investors suffering additional long-term consequences.1  Fama (1980) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) postulate that the labor market for directors operates in an efficient 
manner, using reputational penalties rather than legal consequences, to discipline 
directors that are ineffective monitors; however, recent research has indicated that 
reputational penalties are not applied uniformly across all directors following a reporting 
failure [Srinivasan (2005) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007)].  As a result, some have 
questioned whether the labor market for directors operates in an effective way 
[Richardson (2005) and Helland (2006)]. 
Financial restatements are an acknowledgement that previously issued financial 
statements were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles [Palmrose and Scholz (2004)] and that the firm’s internal controls have failed 
to either prevent or detect the problem leading to the restatement prior to the issuance of 
the firm’s financial statements [Kinney and McDaniel (1989)].  As a result, restatements 
provide information signals about the quality of an audit committee member whose 
primary fiduciary duty is overseeing the financial reporting process.  An efficient labor 
market, as suggested by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), then uses this signal 
                                                 
1 For purposes of this study, discipline of audit committee members following the announcement of a 
financial reporting failure will be confined to the loss of the individual director’s seat on the audit 
committee. 
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in an ex-post settling up process to take corrective action against those that are 
determined to be ineffective monitors. 
 While Srinivasan (2005), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), Gilson (1990), and Coles 
and Hoi (2003) present findings consistent with the workings of an efficient labor market 
for directors, the results of Srinivasan (2005) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) also 
suggest that the penalties imposed on directors by the market were not done so 
consistently across all directors with financial oversight responsibilities.  Richardson 
(2005) suggests that the response by the labor market to the issuance of restated financial 
statements, as reported by Srinivasan (2005), may not be either large enough or swift 
enough to indicate that the market has efficiently dealt with monitoring failures.  The 
absence of directorial consequences following a financial reporting failure may, however, 
be the result of an efficient labor market correctly identifying audit committee members 
who have uncovered items requiring restatement, who, generally, lack culpability for the 
reporting failure, or whose expertise and experience as a monitor warrant further 
inclusion on the audit committee.  
 If the labor market for directors fails to operate in an efficient manner, the cause 
may not be market anomalies but, rather, agents interfering in the market’s disciplinary 
process.  Boards of directors are often constructed of both managers and outside 
directors, setting up the potential that an insider could dominate the board and engage in 
activities detrimental to the firm’s investors [Fama (1980)].2  Consistent with this 
assertion, Carcello et al. (2008a) present evidence indicating that CEO involvement in the 
                                                 
2 Such activities may include, but are not limited to, causing directors that are ineffective monitors of 
management to be retained on the board of directors as well as the audit committee of the board. 
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nominating process can adversely impact audit committee effectiveness by increasing the 
likelihood of financial reporting failure.  Such meddling in the process by which 
individuals are selected to remain on the board of directors by a powerful CEO may lead 
to the observed inconsistencies in the labor market’s application of reputational penalties 
and may have far reaching effects on the firm’s investors through continued aggressive 
accounting practices [Moore and Pheifer (2004)], earnings reports with lower information 
content [Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Wilson (2008)], and increases in systematic risk. 
 In order to provide empirical evidence about the retention of audit committee 
members following their oversight of a reporting failure, I collect information on 
individual audit committee members who oversaw an income-decreasing financial 
restatement announced between July 1, 2002 and September 30, 2005 as reported by the 
General Accounting Office [GAO (2006)] and/or Audit Analytics.  In order to address 
concerns about the culpability of individual audit committee members, sample firms were 
required to have experienced a previous, unrelated financial reporting failure.  In 
addition, similar information was collected on the individual audit committee members of 
non-restating companies matched on industry, size, and, when available, auditor.   Audit 
committee retention is then modeled as a function of variables indicating the level of 
influence the CEO has over the board and the audit committee, the involvement of the 
CEO in the nominating process, the quality of the individual director, and control 
variables that have been shown to be associated with director turnover.3  My results 
suggest that the audit committee members of firms announcing a restatement do not 
                                                 
3 Individual audit committee members identified as overseeing the restatement of a firm’s financial 
statements will hereafter be referred to as “tainted”. 
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suffer a higher rate of departure from the audit committee than their counterparts at non-
restating firms matched on industry and size.  My results additionally indicate that the 
quality and expertise of the individual directors positively affects the likelihood of 
remaining on the audit committee for both restating and non-restating firms and that the 
level of influence of the CEO over the board and the nominating process is negatively 
related to the likelihood that an individual director remains on the audit committee.  
Overall, these results provide evidence that the labor market for directors operates in an 
efficient and effective manner. 
 In order to examine the potential long-term consequences of retaining tainted 
directors on the audit committee, I calculate abnormal accruals, earnings response 
coefficients, and systematic risk for all sample firms.  Similar to DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998) and Carver et al. (2008), a multivariate setting is used to examine 
accruals behavior over time and comparisons among groups will be made to determine if 
firms retaining tainted audit committee members engage in more aggressive accounting 
practices.  The results, however, suggest that such is not the case.   Similar to Wilson 
(2008), I then examine the relation between abnormal returns and unexpected earnings in 
a multivariate setting to determine whether the informativeness of earnings is influenced 
by the retention of tainted audit committee.   The results indicate that firms retaining a 
majority of directors on the audit committee do not have lower information quality in 
announced earnings.  Finally, I examine whether firms retaining tainted audit committee 
members have higher levels of systematic risk following the announcement of a 
restatement.  The results indicate that no differences exist in the change in systematic risk 
over the two-year period following the announcement of a restatement for the differential 
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groups of restating firms.  Overall, these results are supportive of the hypothesis that the 
labor market for directors operates in an efficient manner. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.   Section II presents theory 
and hypotheses development.  Section III discusses the sample selection and research 
methods used to examine the hypotheses.  Section IV presents the empirical results, and 
Section V discusses the additional analyses, while Section VI concludes. 
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II. Theory and Hypotheses 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation creates an 
agency relationship between the stockholders of a corporation and its manager.  In this 
relationship, managers will expend company resources in order to maximize their own 
utility, while stockholders will engage in monitoring activities that limit the ability of 
managers to expend firm resources on non-pecuniary benefits [Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)].  These monitoring activities that shareholders choose to engage in may take 
many forms, such as annual audits, budget constraints, or incentive compensation 
packages; however, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the board of directors has 
become the principal tool in monitoring the activities of management and is the apex of 
decision control within the company due to the delegation of authority to it by diffuse 
shareholders. 
While the board of directors delegates much of its decision control to 
management, it retains ultimate control over those managers and sets the major policies 
for the firm.  As part of carrying out this fiduciary duty, the board of directors delegates 
responsibility for the oversight of the financial reporting process to the audit committee.  
As part of its duties, the audit committee is charged with auditor engagement decisions, 
oversight of the internal audit function, ensuring the effectiveness of internal controls, 
resolving conflicts between the external auditor and management, and ensuring the 
reliability of the financial statements.  As a result, audit committees are generally viewed 
as enhancing the overall quality of monitoring and reducing agency costs to shareholders 
[Pincus et al. (1989), Beasley (1996), and DeFond et al. (2005)]. 
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Prior studies additionally suggest that the quality of monitoring effectiveness is 
enhanced when the audit committee possesses stronger governance characteristics.  
Bedard et al. (2004) indicate that having at least one financial expert on the audit 
committee can improve the quality of reported earnings, and DeFond et al. (2005) and 
Davidson et al. (2004) both suggest that investors value the presence of financial 
expertise on the audit committee.  Klein (2002a) also notes that greater audit committee 
independence can improve the reliability of earnings, and Carcello and Neal (2000 and 
2003) suggest that audit committee independence influences the independent auditor’s 
decision to issue a going concern opinion by more effectively shielding the auditor from 
dismissal.  Finally, Lee et al. (2004) find that independent audit committees reduce the 
likelihood of auditor resignation and increase the likelihood that a quality auditor is 
engaged.  As a result, audit committees that posses financial expertise and are more 
independent of management may further enhance the integrity of the reporting process 
and provide investors with a higher level of assurance that reported earnings are 
reflective of the firm’s true financial position. 
A financial restatement, however, raises concerns about the ability of the audit 
committee to adequately oversee the financial reporting process.  Restatements are an 
acknowledgement that previously issued financial statements were not prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles [Palmrose and Scholz (2004)] 
and that the firm’s internal controls have failed to either prevent or detect the problem 
leading to the restatement prior to the issuance of the firm’s financial statements [Kinney 
and McDaniel (1989)].   The General Accounting Office (2002) also notes that 
questionable corporate accounting practices have likely played a role in the increasing 
 8
number of financial restatements.  Restatements may, therefore, be an indication that the 
audit committee has failed to effectively carry out its fiduciary duty to monitor the 
activities of management. 
Consistent with this assertion, prior studies have found evidence that audit 
committee characteristics indicative of lax monitoring are associated with reporting 
failures.  Abbott et al. (2004) find that firms are more likely to restate earnings when the 
audit committee is not independent of management, fails to have a minimum number of 
meetings, and fails to possess an audit committee financial expert.  Farber (2005) 
indicates that firms accused of fraud, likewise, have fewer audit committee meetings and 
fewer audit committee financial experts than does a sample of matched non-fraud firms.  
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) also indicate that firms without an audit committee financial 
expert are more likely to restate earnings, while, contrary to Abbott et al. (2004), they 
find no evidence that audit committee independence is associated with the likelihood to 
restate earnings.  Overall, these findings suggest that less than effective monitoring of the 
reporting process by the audit committee contributes to the risk that a restatement will 
occur. 
Recent regulatory changes have, likewise, implied that ineffective audit 
committee monitoring can increase the possibility of financial reporting failures.  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the purpose of which was to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of financial reporting, contains provisions that seek to strengthen the audit 
committee’s role in overseeing the reporting process.  The Act now requires the audit 
committee to make auditor engagement decisions (Section 301) as well as approve all 
services provided by the firm’s independent auditor (Sections 201 and 202).  It 
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additionally requires that the independent auditor report to the audit committee instead of 
management (Section 204).  Furthermore, the Act requires the audit committee to 
establish procedures to handle complaints and concerns from the auditor as well as from 
employees about accounting, internal control, or auditing matters (Section 301) and 
requires issuers to either name an audit committee financial expert or to indicate the 
reasons why the firm does not possess an audit committee member with financial 
expertise (Section 407).  Finally, the Act (Section 301), as well as both the NYSE (NYSE 
Listed Company Manual, Section 303A) and NASD (NASD Manual Rule 4350) listing 
standards, require that the audit committee be completely independent of management. 
These regulatory changes are consistent with prior research on audit committee 
effectiveness and are indicative of the role that audit committees are thought to play in 
mitigating the risk of financial reporting failures. 
Despite evidence and regulatory suggestions that effective monitoring by the audit 
committee can improve the quality of financial reporting and reduce the likelihood of a 
financial reporting failure, audit committee members face few legal penalties following 
such an event.  Srinivasan (2005) found that fewer than six percent of outside directors 
and audit committee members from firms that had restated earnings were named as 
defendants in securities litigation, and this occurred only when the directors in question 
had sold company stock during the restatement period.  Srinivasan (2005) further reports 
that those directors named as defendants generally did not suffer any personal financial 
penalties, since settlement amounts were typically paid by the company’s D&O insurance 
carrier and by the company itself.  As a result, the legal system provides audit committee 
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members with limited incentives to carry out their fiduciary duty to the stockholders of 
the firm. 
While the legal system generally lacks the ability to induce audit committee 
members to effectively carry out their fiduciary duties, the labor market for directors 
may, through reputational incentives, provide the necessary impetus for directors to 
monitor the financial reporting process.   Audit committee members are able to develop 
reputations as experts in decision control and, as a result of their experience and 
reputation, receive additional benefits [Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983)].  These 
benefits are generally in the form of additional directorships that provide both financial 
and non-financial remuneration to the individual director [Brickley et al. (1999) and 
Harford (2003)].  These reputational incentives are, thus, based on past performance in 
decision control environments and may be adjusted as individual reputations are updated 
when current firm events reveal more information about an individual’s ability to monitor 
the activities of management. 
In the presence of an efficient labor market for directors, as suggested by Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), this ex-post settling up process following the 
revelation of new information about director quality will result in effective directors 
either gaining new directorships or, at least, maintaining their current number of board 
seats, while directors that have become tainted as a result of events indicative of laxity in 
the oversight of management are likely to suffer penalties in the form of fewer 
opportunities to serve on boards of directors, including the board of the firm required to 
restate its financial statements.  Consistent with this assertion, Srinivasan (2005) and Fich 
and Shivdasani (2007) find that directors who oversee a financial reporting failure lose 
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outside directorships at other firms and that this loss in board seats is exacerbated by their 
presence on the audit committee of the firm experiencing the reporting failure.  Similarly, 
Gilson (1990) finds that fewer than 50 percent of incumbent directors and CEOs remain 
with a firm following the conclusion of a bankruptcy and that directors who resign from 
these financially distressed companies serve on fewer boards of other companies.  
Finally, Coles and Hoi (2003) suggest that directors of companies that do not adopt the 
anti-takeover provisions contained in Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 are more likely to 
gain additional directorships.  Thus, evidence suggests that the labor market for directors 
provides incentives for audit committee members to effectively discharge their duty to 
monitor the financial reporting process.  
 Although evidence suggests that the labor market operates in an efficient manner 
following the revelation of new information about director quality, the labor market’s 
lack of uniformity in imposing penalties following a reporting failure raises questions 
about its ability to provide reputational incentives that are strong enough to induce audit 
committee members to effectively monitor the financial reporting process.  Srinivasan 
(2005) reports that 48 percent of all outside directors lose their position on the board of a 
firm restating its earnings, and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that only 17 percent of all 
outside directors lose their board seat following allegations of fraud.4   Considering these 
events have a large negative impact on the valuation of the firm [Palmrose et al. (2004)] 
and that the extant literature has generally used these events to indicate monitoring 
                                                 
4 The large difference between the reported rate of loss of board seats in these two studies may be 
attributable to differences in research design.  Srinivasan (2005) uses announced restatements where, 
theoretically, “blame” can be affixed at the time of the announcement; whereas, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
use allegations of fraud where “blame” may not be affixed until some time before or at the time of the 
settlement of fraud litigation.  
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failures on the part of the board and, more specifically, the audit committee, one might 
expect the percentage of outside directors retaining their position on the board of 
directors to be much lower.  As a result, a disconnect appears to exist between the nature 
of the reporting failure and the consequences meted out by the labor market for directors. 
 Richardson (2005) suggests that this discrepancy may be the result of the market’s 
inability to consistently provide directors with incentives to effectively monitor the 
financial reporting process, stating that the size and timeliness of the labor market’s 
response to the issuance of restated financial statements, as reported by Srinivasan 
(2005), may not be either large enough or swift enough to indicate otherwise.5  Beasley et 
al. (2007), however, suggest that audit committee members choose board appointments 
rather judiciously and consciously provide a strong effort in monitoring the activities of 
management and the financial reporting process.  In addition, these board members were 
often nominated for a position on the audit committee due to either their financial or 
industry expertise.  These results imply that the observed retention rates of directors 
following a financial reporting failure may, in fact, be due to an efficient market 
identifying directors who possess the requisite experience and expertise to faithfully 
discharge their fiduciary duties to the shareholders, who have sought to maintain their 
independence from management and to improve the reporting process, and who, 
                                                 
5 Although the literature has generally viewed restatements as indicative of poor monitoring by the audit 
committee, I recognize that this may not always be the case.  As a result, the apparent lack of consequences 
following a reporting failure could be the result of 1) a monitoring success, 2) less severe restatements, 3) 
lack of service on the audit committee during the period restated, and 4) a concerted effort on the part of 
others to undermine the reporting process.  To the extent that variables included in the model fail to control 
for potentially positive signals about director quality following a reporting failure, bias is introduced into 
the analyses of director retention. 
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generally, lack culpability for the failures in the reporting process that initially led to the 
restatement.  
If, as Richardson (2005) suggests, the labor market for directors fails to 
sufficiently discipline directors following a financial reporting failure, the decision 
authority concerning board appointments must be relatively free of natural market 
pressures.  This may occur when the CEO is capable of either gaining control of the 
nominating process or is able to unduly influence the appointment of directors to the 
board.  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) indicate that when such does occur fewer 
independent, outside directors and more gray directors are appointed to the board.  
Further, Carcello et al. (2008a) suggest that CEO involvement in the nominating process 
can adversely impact audit committee effectiveness by increasing the likelihood of 
financial reporting failure.   These results are suggestive of the CEO’s ability to influence 
the composition of the board and to shield directors from labor market reprisals following 
a reporting failure.  Thus, apparent discrepancies in the labor market’s treatment of 
tainted audit committee members may stem from the concentration of power in the hands 
of a CEO who is capable of protecting others from the typical consequences of lax 
monitoring.   
Another rationale for an agent to cause a tainted director to be retained on the 
audit committee is that the two share ties with one another outside the board of directors.  
Battiston, et al. (2003) and Fich and White (2003) both suggest that CEOs benefit from 
outside relationships with other board members and Thomas (2005) indicates that these 
types of ties may have delayed efforts by shareholders to remove Philip Purcell from the 
position of chairman and chief executive at Morgan Stanley.  While the existence of such 
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relationships are generally thought to benefit only the manager of a firm, it may also be 
indicative of the degree of loyalty necessary to induce the CEO to bring about the 
retention of a tainted audit committee member on the board.  
A third motivation for a CEO to cause a tainted director to be retained on the audit 
committee is that the agent wishes to exploit the individual director’s penchant for laxity 
in the oversight of the financial reporting process to engage in the type of behavior that 
led to the initial restatement.  Economic theory would suggest that a manager engages in 
certain strategies knowing that the result could be a restatement of the financial 
statements.  Once this event happens, some managers reassess their strategy and are 
unwilling to continue therein.  For others, however, the original strategy had correctly 
considered the possibility that the firm would be required to restate its financials, and, as 
a result, the strategy is as viable after the restatement as it was before.  Consistent with 
this assertion, Moore and Pfeiffer (2004) present evidence indicating that managers do 
not abandon their prior strategies of aggressive reporting practices following a 
restatement.  Consequently, the desire on the part of a CEO to continue engaging in a 
strategy that could result in another restatement may provide the impetus for the agent to 
bring about the retention of tainted audit committee members.  
In the presence of an efficient labor market for directors, however, the retention of 
tainted directors on the audit committee is likely associated with the qualitative 
characteristics of the individual director.  Cohen et al. (2008) report that audit committee 
members in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era are more active, diligent, knowledgeable, and 
powerful, and DeZoort et al. (2007) indicate that audit committees act in a more 
conservative manner and are more concerned with the accuracy of the financial 
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statements in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era.  Consistent with these findings, Beasley et al. 
(2007) find that audit committee members appear committed to being engaged in 
substantive monitoring of the financial reporting process and that prior financial and 
industry experience are important prerequisites for audit committee service.  As a result, 
the retention of tainted directors on the audit committee may be the result of an efficient 
market correctly identifying high-quality directors whose purpose is to maintain integrity 
in the financial reporting process. 
As a result of this discussion, I develop the following hypotheses: 
H1a:  The retention of tainted directors on the audit committee is related 
to the authority of the CEO. 
 
H1b:  The retention of tainted directors on the audit committee is related 
to director quality. 
 
H2:  Financial reporting quality is related to the retention of tainted 
directors on the audit committee. 
 
 
 If inefficiencies exist in the labor market for directors, retaining a tainted director 
on the audit committee may benefit the manager of a firm, while it is likely to have 
negative long-term consequences for the shareholders of the firm.  Restatements, by their 
nature, cause revisions in past and future earnings, increase uncertainty concerning the 
integrity of management and the quality of future earnings, and provide information 
about the past practices of management.  As a result, investors are likely to revise their 
perceptions of financial statement risk causing future earnings announcements to be 
viewed more skeptically, and market participants are likely to reassess a firm’s 
systematic risk based on the nature of the firms actions following the restatememt.  
Consistent with this idea, Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Wu (2002) indicate that the 
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information content of earnings is lower following a restatement, and Cloninger and 
Waller (2000) indicate that, following the announcement of fraud, systematic risk 
remains unchanged only in those cases where management’s purpose in committing the 
fraud was to expropriate shareholder wealth.  
 The faith investors place in the reported financial figures that is lost following a 
reporting failure can, however, be restored.  Farber (2005) finds that firms who have 
engaged in fraudulent financial reporting are able to regain a portion of the investors’ 
trust lost through fraudulent activity by improving corporate governance.  In addition, 
Wilson (2008) indicates that investors’ concerns about the informativeness of earnings 
diminish rather quickly following a restatement with earnings response coefficients 
returning to pre-restatement levels in four quarters on average, and Cloniger and Waller 
(2000) indicate that systematic risk is lowered following the announcement of fraud when 
corrective actions are taken.  Thus, the negative consequences experienced by investors 
following a restatement may be able to be reversed if actions are taken to reduce the risk 
that the reported financial numbers are not reflective of the true financial position of the 
company.  
 In the presence of an efficient labor market, retaining tainted directors on the audit 
committee indicates to investors that those directors possess the necessary characteristics 
to ensure that quality is maintained in the monitoring function.  Consequently, investors 
are not likely to view changes in perceived financial statement risk, the quality of future 
earnings, and a firm’s systematic risk differentially based on the perceived level of 
corrective action taken against individual directors.  This leads to the following additional 
hypotheses: 
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H3:  Earnings response coefficients are related to the retention of tainted 
directors on the audit committee.  
 
H4:  Subsequent measures of systematic risk are related to the retention of 
tainted directors on the audit committee. 
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III.  Research Methodology and Design 
Sample Determination 
 The restatement sample consists of firms that announced a negative income 
adjusting restatement from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005 as reported by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) (2006) and/or Audit Analytics (anchor restatements).  In order 
to address concerns about the culpability of audit committee members for the 
restatement, sample firms will be furthered required to have experienced a prior financial 
restatement as identified by either the GAO (2002), the GAO (2006), or Audit Analytics.  
Of those firms identified as having potentially experienced multiple restatements, all SEC 
filings related to the identified restatements are examined to eliminate all but the first 
instance that a restatement is identified, non-negative income adjusting anchor 
restatements, restatements related to lease issues in 2005, and restatements that were 
announced but for which no restated filings are found.6  In addition, all foreign firms are 
dropped from the sample.  This process results in a potential sample of 143 firms that 
have experienced a restatement prior to the negative income adjusting anchor 
restatement.  From this sample, 12 firms are dropped due to not being listed in either the 
CRSP or Compustat databases, resulting in a sample of 131 multiple restatement firms.   
These firms are then matched, based on industry (SIC Code), size (Assets), and, 
when available, auditor, with firms that have not experienced a restatement, as identified 
by either GAO (2002), GAO (2006) or Audit Analytics, during the period of time from 
                                                 
6 Among the restating firms, seven firms have prior restatements that were announced more than four years 
prior to the announcement of the anchor restatement.  Of these seven firms, four meet the necessary 
requirements to be included in the final analyses. 
 19
October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2007.  This process results in an additional six firms 
being dropped from the restatement sample due to insufficient data for the match, and 
one firm being dropped due to the lack of a suitable match.  As a result, the sample 
includes 124 firms that have experienced a multiple restatement and their corresponding 
non-restating match. 
 Information about both the firm and individual audit committee members are then 
collected from proxy filings made with the SEC for both the sample firm and its 
corresponding match.  This process entailed coding information from the proxy filing 
made just prior to the announcement of the restatement as well as from the three proxy 
filings made subsequent to the announcement of the restatement.  Consistent with other 
studies looking at audit committee characteristics, a “look-back” approach is used when 
collecting information specific to the audit committee, while board specific information is 
collected using a “look-forward” approach.7  The data requirements imposed on the 
sample for inclusion result in an additional 54 firms being dropped from the sample.  As 
a result, the final sample is made up of 70 firms that have experienced multiple 
restatements and their non-restating match.  Table 1 contains a summary of the sample 
selection process, as well as, a summarization of the quality of the match for the final 
sample. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
Models 
 
                                                 
7 A look back approach to data collection uses a firm’s filing made subsequent to the year of interest to 
collect certain data items.  For example, the composition of a firm’s audit committee in 2005 is determined 
by examining the proxy filing made in 2006.  A look forward approach uses a firm’s filing made in the year 
of interest to collect certain data items.  For example, the composition of a firm’s board of directors in 2005 
is determined by examining the proxy filing made in 2005. 
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 In order to test hypothesis 1, I model the retention of a director on the audit 
committee as a function of variables indicating the level of authority possessed by the 
CEO, the involvement of the CEO in the nominating process, the audit committee 
member’s direct ties to the CEO, the quality of the individual director, and firm and 
individual specific control variables in the following probit model corrected for non-
independent firm level observations using robust standard errors that take into account 


















































































                                (1) 
where 
RETENTION    = 1 if the tainted director is retained on the audit 
committee, else 0; 
BOSS     = 1 if the positions of chairman and CEO are combined, 
else 0; 
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CEO_FOUNDER   = 1 if the CEO is the founder of the company or is part of 
the founding family, else 0; 
CEO_INVOLVE_NC   = 1 if CEO is involved in the nominating process, else 0; 
CEO_TIE    = 1 if the audit committee member shares ties with the 
CEO outside the board of directors of the restating firm, 
else 08; 
CEO_TENURE  = the number of concurrent years that the CEO has served 
in that position at the time of the restatement 
announcement; 
CEO_APT_BOD  = 1 if the audit committee member’s tenure begins after 
that of the CEO, else 0; 
SIZE     = the natural log of the total assets of the firm  
(Compustat #6); 
LITIGATION    = 1 if the firm is in a highly litigious industry as defined by 
the firm’s two-digit SIC code at the time of the restatement 
[(Hogan and Jeter (1999)], else 0; 
BOARD_SIZE   = the number of directors serving on the board at the time 
of the restatement announcement; 
PCT_OUTSIDE   = the percentage of outside directors on the board at the 
time of the restatement announcement; 
AGE     = the age of the audit committee member; 
                                                 
8 Ties between the CEO and audit committee members are determined using biographical information 
contained in the proxy statement and may include, but are not limited to previous, joint service on a board 
of directors and prior employment relationships. 
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TENURE    = the number of years that the audit committee member has 
served on the board of directors; 
FIN_EXPERT   = 1 if the audit committee member is identified as the audit 
committee financial expert in the year of the restatement, 
else 0; 
OUTSIDE_CEO   = 1 if the audit committee member is the CEO at another 
company, else 0; 
DIR_OWN    = percentage of firm’s common stock owned by the audit 
committee member; 
DIR_GAIN   = 1 if the audit committee member has a net gain of at least 
one outside directorship following the issuance of restated 
financial statements, else 0; and 
RESTATE   =1 if the firm experience a restatement of the financial 
statements, else 0. 
The test variables BOSS [Dechow et al. (1996) and Dunn (2004)], 
CEO_FOUNDER [Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Carcello et al. (2008c)], 
CEO_APT_BOD [Wade et al. (1990)], and CEO_TENURE [Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988)] measure the chief executive officer’s ability to influence the decisions of the 
board of directors and, hence, the composition of the board.  Likewise, 
CEO_INVOLVE_NC [Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Carcello et al. (2008a)] 
measures the involvement of the CEO in the nominating process by identifying those 
boards where 1) the CEO sits on the nominating committee of the board, 2) no 
nominating committee exists, but SEC filings indicate that the board, as a whole, acts on 
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the nomination of directors, or 3) SEC filings directly state that management is involved 
in the nominating process.  In the presence of inefficiencies in the labor market for 
directors, I expect a positive relation between RETENTION and each of these variables.9 
The test variable, CEO_TIE, signifies the loyalties that may exist between the 
CEO and an audit committee member by identifying outside relationships that tie the 
individuals to one another.  Fich and White [2003] and Battiston et al. [2003] examine 
such allegiances on the board of directors by identifying situations where directors serve 
on at least two boards together.  Their approach indicates that outside relationships 
between the CEO and other board members are positively related with executive 
compensation and the probability that CEO initiated strategies are approved by the board 
of directors.  As a result, this study will use a similar approach to identify instances where 
the CEO and audit committee member serve on other boards together as well as other 
outside relationships that directly tie the two to one another.10  Likewise, the variable 
OUTSIDE_CEO may indicate the degree of loyalty that exists between the CEO and 
individuals who have achieved the same level of status at other corporations.  Thus, a 
positive relation is also expected between RETENTION and each of these variables. 
In addition to the test variables, I control for firm-level effects that may be related 
to director turnover.  These factors include (predicted relation with RETENTION in 
parentheses):  the size of the firm (positive) [Hermalin and Weisbach (1988)], whether 
the firm is in a highly litigious industry as defined by Hogan and Jeter (1999) (negative), 
                                                 
9 In this, as well as in subsequent analyses, the independence of the audit committee is not considered as a 
control variable due to the sample period considered and the lack of variation during the sample period 
concerning the independence of the audit committee. 
10 Other outside relationships are determined using biographical information contained in the proxy 
statement and may include, but are not limited to previous, joint service on a board of directors and prior 
employment relationships. 
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the size of the board (no prediction) [Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993)], and 
the percentage of the board that is independent of management (negative) [Beasley 
(1996), Dechow et al. (1996), and Klein (2002a)].  All governance variables are collected 
from the appropriate proxy filing and are measured as of the proxy filing immediately 
preceding the restatement announcement unless otherwise noted.  All other firm level 
variables are obtained from Compustat unless otherwise noted. 
 Finally, I control for individual-specific effects that may be associated with 
director turnover.  These factors include (predicted relation with RETENTION in 
parentheses):  the age of the individual audit committee member (no prediction) [Farrell 
and Whidbee (2000) and Yermack (2004)], the tenure of the audit committee member on 
the board of directors (positive) [Srinivasan (2005)], whether the audit committee 
member is the audit committee financial expert (negative) [Carcello et al. (2008a), 
Beasley et al. (2007), and Srinivasan (2005)], the percentage of the firm’s common stock 
owned by the audit committee member (positive) [Farrell and Whidbee (2000) and Fich 
and Shivdasani (2007)], and whether the audit committee member experienced a net gain 
of outside directorships held following the restatement (positive) [Ferris et al (2003)]. 
 In order to test hypothesis 2, I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for aggressive 
accounting choices.  Estimation of discretionary accruals is done using the modified 
Jones model presented in Dechow et al. (1995) with further modifications suggested by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006).  This method estimates total accruals as a function of the 
change in revenues adjusted for the change in net receivables, the level of property, plant 
and equipment, and proxies for gains and losses to control for the asymmetric timeliness 
of gain and loss recognition.  Tests conducted by Dechow et al. (1995) indicate that the 
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modified Jones method of estimating total accruals provides the most powerful test of 
earnings management, while Ball and Shivakumar (2006) demonstrate that controlling 
for asymmetric timeliness in gain and loss recognition substantially improves model 
specification.  Formally presented, the model is: 
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where 
TAij   = total accruals for firm i in industry j [Compustat #123 – (Compustat 
#308 - Compustat #124)] [Hribar and Collins (2002)]; 
Aijt-1  = lagged total assets for firm i in industry j (Compustat #6); 
ΔREVij  = the change in revenues from year t-1 to year t for firm i in industry j 
(Compustat#12); 
ΔRECij  = the change in net receivables from year t-1 to year t for firm i in industry 
j (Compustat #2);  
PPEij   = the gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in industry j 
(Compustat #7); 
CFij   = cash flow from operations for firm i in industry j (Compustat #308) 
DCFij   = 1 if CFij <0, else 0; 
CFij*DCFij  = interaction between CFij and DCFij; and 
εij  = the error term. 
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 Consistent with Butler et al. (2004) and Kothari et al. (2005), all variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to control for outliers before estimating equation 
2 for each three, two, and one-digit SIC code grouping with at least 20 usable 
observations [Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007)].  The parameter estimates obtained from 





























































                                               (3) 
Each firm’s unadjusted abnormal accruals are then calculated as the difference between 
total accruals, TA/At-1, and expected accruals, EA/At-1. 
 Kothari et al. (2005) indicates that estimated discretionary accruals are influenced 
by both contemporaneous and past firm performance; however, the modified Jones model 
attempts only to control for contemporaneous firm performance.  As a result, unadjusted 
abnormal accruals contain a portion of what could be considered “normal” earnings 
management given the firm’s level of performance [Carcello et al. (2008b)].  In order to 
correct for this problem, Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that abnormal accruals be 
performance adjusted based on each sample firm’s prior year return-on-assets (ROA).  
Specifically, firms are ranked into deciles based on the prior year’s ROA, and the median 
abnormal accrual is calculated for each industry group ROA decile, where the median 
ROA value excludes the sample firm.  The sample firm’s performance-adjusted abnormal 
accrual is then set equal to the difference between its unadjusted abnormal accrual and 
the median abnormal accrual for the proper industry group ROA decile. 
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 Following the methodology of DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Carcello et al. 
(2008b), and Carver et al. (2008), I then examine the behavior of abnormal accruals over 
the period of time beginning the year prior to the announcement of the restatement (Year 
–1) and concluding the second year following the restatement (Year 2) using the 


















                                                 (4) 
where 
PAACit  = performance adjusted accruals for firm i in year t; 
DUM0,1,2it = 1 if year t is the year of the restatement, the year following the 
restatement, or the second year following the restatement for firm i, else 
0; 
DUM1,2it = 1 if year t is the year following the restatement or the second year 
following the restatement for firm i, else 0; 
DUM2it = 1 if year t is the second year following the restatement for firm i, else 0; 
SIZEit   = the natural log of the market value of equity in year t for firm i; 
M/Bit   = the market value of the firm in year t divided by the book value of 
assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
DISTRESSit  = Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index in year t for firm i; 
OCFit   = cash flow from operations in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1 for 
firm i; 
LEVERAGEit = total debt in year t divided by total assets in year t for firm i; 
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BIG4it   = 1 if firm i is audited by a Big 4 firm in year t, else 0;  
εit   = the error term for firm i in year t. 
The dummy variables DUM0,1,2it, DUM1,2it, and DUM2it used in equation 4 provide 
a means of examining both the levels of accruals and changes in accruals over the period 
of time from the Year –1 to Year 2 by combining parameter estimates.  Specifically, 
these items are calculated as follows: 
Year –1   = α 
ΔYear –1 to Year 0  = β1 
Year 0   = α + β1 
ΔYear 0 to Year 1  = β2 
Year 1   = α + β1 + β2 
ΔYear 1 to Year 2  = β3 
Year 2   = α + β1 + β2 + β3 
 Equation 4 will be separately estimated for each of the following groups:  
restating firms that remove less than a majority of the tainted directors from the audit 
committee and firms that remove a majority of tainted directors from the audit 
committee.  Accrual levels and changes will then be calculated and the appropriate joint 
tests conducted to determine the behavior of accruals within groups.  Accrual levels and 
changes will then be compared across models to determine if differences exist between 
groups.  By examining abnormal accruals in this manner, the relative aggressiveness of 
accounting choices can be determined and empirically tested.  In the presence of 
inefficiencies in the labor market, I expect restating firms who remove less than a 
majority of the tainted directors from the audit committee to be more aggressive in their 
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accounting choices than restating firms who do remove a majority of the tainted directors 
from the audit committee.   
 In order to examine how the retention of tainted audit committee members affects 
the information content of earnings, I use the earnings response coefficient to quarterly 
earnings announcements for the 9 quarters, excluding the quarter of the restatement 
announcement, beginning one quarter prior to the restatement announcement and ending 
8 quarters subsequent to the restatement announcement.  Similar to the methodology 
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where  
CARit    = the three-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the 
earnings announcement date for firm i at quarter t based upon 
value-weighted returns and calculated using EVENTUS; 
QTRit    = 1 if firm i's earnings announcement belongs to quarter t, else 0; 
RETAIN_MAJ_ACi  = 1 if firm i retains a majority of the audit committee intact 
following the restatement, else 0; 
UEit    = is the unexpected earnings for firm i at quarter t’s announcement 
date calculated as the difference between actual reported earnings 
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per share and the mean analyst forecast using the First Call
 database scaled by the closing stock price two days prior to the 
issuance of the earnings announcement; and 
NONLINEARit  = UEit*│UEit│ and controls for documented non-linear association 
in the price earnings relation [Freeman and Tse (1989), 
Subramanyam (1996), and Lipe et al. (1998)]. 
Control variables are then described as follows: 
M/Bit   = the market value of the firm i at quarter t (Compustat #14 * Compustat 
#61) divided by the book value of the firm i at quarter t (Compustat #59) 
and controls for firm growth [Collins and Kothari (1989) and Kothari 
(2001)]; 
BETAit  = the market-model beta for firm i estimated over the period beginning 
255 trading days prior to the earnings announcement at quarter t and 
ending two trading days prior to the earnings announcement at quarter t 
and controls for firm systematic risk [Collins and Kothari (1989), Easton 
and Zmijewski (1989), and Kothari (2001)]; 
SIZEit   = natural log of the market value of equity (Compustat #14 * Compustat 
#61) for firm i at quarter t [Easton and Zmijewski (1989)]. 
LOSSit   = 1 if reported earnings per share is less than 0 for firm i in quarter t and 
controls for the lower information content of earnings announcements 
with negative earnings per share [Hayn (1995)] , else 0; 
Q4it   = 1 if firm i's earnings announcement for quarter t is for the fourth quarter 
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of the fiscal year and controls for the lower earnings quality of fourth 
 quarter earnings announcements [Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) and
 Salamon and Stober (1994)] , else 0; and 
STDRETit  = standard deviation of stock returns for the 25 trading days prior to the 
  earnings announcement for firm i at quarter t. 
 For each group of firms examined, parameter estimates obtained from equation 5 
will be used to calculate their earnings response coefficient for each quarter examined in 
the study.  Calculation of the ERCs for each group are only shown for the quarter prior to 
the restatement and for the four quarters following the restatement for brevity and are as 
follows: 
Firms removing a majority of the tainted directors from the audit committee following a 
restatement: 
Prior-Quarter = β1 
Q1 = β1 + β3,t=1 
Q2 = β1 + β3,t=2 
Q3 = β1 + β3,t=3 
Q4 = β1 + β3,t=4 
Firms keeping a majority of the audit committee intact following the restatement: 
Prior-Quarter = β1 + β2 
Q1 = β1 + β2 + β3,t=1 + β4,t=1 
Q2 = β1 + β2 + β3,t=2 + β4,t=2 
Q3 = β1 + β2 + β3,t=3 + β4,t=3 
Q4 = β1 + β2 + β3,t=4 + β4,t=4 
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In the presence of inefficiencies in the market for directors, I expect restating firms 
removing less than a majority of the tainted directors from the audit committee to exhibit 
earnings response coefficients that are significantly lower than the earnings response 
coefficients of restating firms who do remove a majority of the tainted directors from the 
audit committee. 
 In order to examine how the retention of tainted directors on the audit committee 
affects the systematic risk of the restating firm, I estimate the beta for each firm during 
the period prior to the restatement announcement, as well as for the period two years 
following the announcement of the restatement.  Beta is estimated using the value-
weighted index of market returns available from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) and a 220-day estimation period beginning at day –240 and ending at day 
–21, where day 0 is the day of the restatement announcement (two years following the 
restatement announcement).  Comparisons are then made between the changes in beta for 
restating firms retaining a majority of the audit committee in place and restating firms 
that fail to retain a majority of tainted directors on the audit committee.  In addition, 
changes in beta for the differential remedial actions following a restatement are examined 
in a multivariate setting using the following equation: 
εββββα +Δ+Δ+Δ++=Δ iiiii SalesROALogEquityACMAJRETAINBeta 4321 __    (6) 
where 
ΔBetai   = the change in beta for firm i; 
RETAIN_MAJ_ACi  = 1 if firm i retains a majority of the audit committee intact 
following the restatement, else 0; 
ΔLogEquityi  = the change in the log of the market equity of firm i measured 
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two days prior to the restatement announcement and two days prior 
to the two year anniversary of the restatement announcement; 
ΔROAi   = the change in net income scaled by lagged total assets for firm i; 
and 
ΔSalesi   =the change in net sales scaled by lagged total assets for firm i. 
In the presence of inefficiencies in the market for directors, I expect systematic risk to 
increase following the announcement of the restatement, and I expect significant 
differences in systematic risk based on the differential decisions made regarding the 






 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the retention of tainted directors on the 
audit committee of the board of directors, variables indicative of the ability of the CEO to 
influence the decisions of the audit committee members, variables indicative of the 
quality of the tainted directors, and other control variables for both my sample of 
restating firms and their corresponding match.  The turnover rate on the audit committee 
of restating firms is 25.8% and is not significantly different from the audit committee 
turnover rate of non-restating firms.  This result is consistent with the results of Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007) and Agrawal et al. (1999), who find no evidence indicating that 
outside directors experience an abnormal turnover rate on the boards of firms accused of 
financial statement fraud.  In addition, no significant differences are indicated between 
restating firms and their non-restating matches on either variables indicative of the CEO’s 
influence over the audit committee (BOSS, CEO_FOUNDER, CEO_INVOLVE_NC, 
CEO_TIE, CEO_TENURE, and CEO_APT_BOD), or other control variables (SIZE, 
LITIGATION, BOARD_SIZE, and PCT_OUTSIDE).  Member of the audit committee at 
non-restating firms are found to own a significantly greater proportion of the outstanding 
common stock (0.89%) than their counterparts at restating firms (0.26%); however, 
among other variables reflective of the quality of individual directors (AGE, TENURE, 
FIN_EXPERT, OUTSIDE_CEO, and DIR_GAIN), no significant differences exist.  
Overall, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 indicate few differences between 
restating firms and non-restating firms matched on industry, size, and, when available, 
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auditor.  This lack of differences between groups may suggest that the labor market for 
directors operates in an efficient manner; however, it may indicate the ability of 
management to lessen the effect of reputational penalties to audit committee members 
following multiple financial reporting failures. These competing hypotheses are 
examined in detail below. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
 Table 3 Panel A presents results from estimating equation (1) with standard errors 
corrected for clustering among firms.  The model is significant at the 0.01 level (Wald 
χ2=57.10) and has a Pseudo R2 of 11.63%.  Table 3 Panel B, then, presents the partial 
effect that each variable has on the response probability of remaining on the audit 
committee for restating firms and their non-restating match.  For restating firms, the 
results indicate that BOSS and CEO_TIE are significant at the 0.10 level and 0.05 level, 
respectively, and negatively related to the retention of directors on the audit committee, 
while FIN_EXPERT is significant at the 0.05 level and positively related to the retention 
of directors on the audit committee.  In comparison, CEO_INVOLVE_NC and 
CEO_APT_BOD are significant at the 0.10 level and 0.05 level, respectively, and 
negatively related to the retention of directors on the audit committee of non-restating 
firms, while CEO_TENURE is significant at the 0.05 level and positively related to the 
retention of directors on the audit committee at non-restating firms.  Finally, at non-
restating firms, FIN_EXPERT and DIR_GAIN are both significant at the 0.01 level and 
positively related to the retention of directors on the audit committee of the board of 
directors.  Overall, these results suggest that the quality and experience of individual 
directors are important to decisions regarding the continuing composition of the audit 
committee at both restating and non-restating firms and that, generally, the level of 
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influence of the CEO negatively affects such composition decisions at both restating and 
non-restating firms.  Consequently, these results are supportive of the hypothesis that the 
labor market for directors operates in an efficient and effective manner. (Tables are 
located in the appendix.) 
Accruals Analysis 
 
 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the measure of discretionary accruals 
and control variables for the sample firms that experienced a negative income adjusting 
restatement partitioned by the retention of a majority of the audit committee following 
the restatement.   Panel A of Table 4 indicates that, following the announcement of a 
restatement, restating firms maintaining a majority of the audit committee in place do not 
significantly differ from those firms removing a majority of directors from their audit 
committee with regard to SIZE, M/B, DISTRESS, OCF, LEVERAGE, or BIG4.  Panel B 
of Table 4 indicates that neither the levels nor the changes in discretionary accruals are 
significantly different from zero for firms removing a majority of the directors from their 
audit committee and that only the level of discretionary accruals in the second year 
following the restatement are significantly different from zero for firms maintaining a 
majority of the audit committee in place following the restatement.  Although the level of 
accruals in the second year following the restatement is significantly different from zero 
at the 0.10 level for firms maintaining a majority of their audit committee in place, tests 
of differences indicate that they are not significantly different from the level of accruals 
for firms removing a majority of directors from the audit committee.  In addition, tests of 
differences indicate that no other differences exist between either the levels or the 
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changes in discretionary accruals for the two groups.  As a result, the descriptive statistics 
provide limited initial evidence that accruals become more positive for firms retaining a 
majority of the audit committee in place in the years following the announcement of the 
restatement; however, the descriptive statistics generally indicate a lack of consequences 
based on the differential approach to audit committee composition following a 
restatement. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
 Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (4) using both restating 
firms that retain a majority of the audit committee in place and restating firms that 
remove a majority of directors from the audit committee, as well as, a comparison of the 
levels and changes in discretionary accruals for those companies.  Panel A of Table 5 
indicates that the base OLS models for both groups of restating firms are significant at 
the 0.01 level and that at least 54% of the variation in the performance adjusted accruals 
is explained by the variation in the independent variables.  Panel A of Table 5 further 
indicates that OCF and DISTRESS are both significant at the 0.01 level and negatively 
related to performance adjusted discretionary accruals for firms retaining a majority of 
their audit committee in place following a restatement and that DISTRESS is significant 
at the 0.10 level and is negatively related to performance adjusted accruals for firms 
removing a majority of directors from the audit committee.  No other control variables 
are significantly related to performance adjusted discretionary accruals for either group of 
firms.  Panel B of Table 5 indicates that neither the level of discretionary accruals nor the 
change in discretionary accruals is significantly different from zero in any period 
examined for either group of firms.  In addition, Panel B of Table 5 indicates that no 
significant differences exist between the level of discretionary accruals or the change in 
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discretionary accruals between the two groups.  This evidence suggests that the decision 
to retain a majority of the audit committee in place following a restatement has no 
adverse effect on accounting choices when compared to removing a majority of the 
directors from the audit committee following a restatement and supports the premise that 
the labor market for directors operates in an efficient and effective manner. (Tables are 
located in the appendix.) 
Analysis of Earnings Response Coefficients 
 
 Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in 
estimating the earnings response coefficients for the sample firms that experienced a 
negative income adjusting restatement partitioned by the retention of a majority of the 
audit committee following the restatement.  Table 6 indicates that unexpected earnings 
are negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level for firms retaining a 
majority of the audit committee in place; however, unexpected earnings are not 
significantly different between the two groups.  Table 6 also indicates that M/B is 2.8 and 
1.9 and BETA is 1.17 and 1.11 for firms maintaining a majority of the audit committee in 
place and firms removing a majority of the directors from the audit committee, 
respectively.  The mean SIZE (measured as the natural log of the market value of equity) 
of the firms is $7.44 million and $7.27 million, respectively.  The mean STDRET is 
0.018 and 0.020, respectively.  Test of differences indicate no differences exist between 
the two groups. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
 Table 7 presents results from estimating equation (5) using the sample of restating 
firms.  Results presented in Table 7 indicate that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
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for firms that remove a majority of the directors from the audit committee is positive and 
significantly different from both zero and the corresponding ERC for firms maintaining a 
majority of the audit committee in place following a restatement in quarter 4, while no 
other ERCs or differences in ERCs are significantly different from zero; however, the 
model is not significant (F=1.18, p=0.2176) rendering all inferences obsolete.  This 
suggests that the decision to retain a majority of directors on the audit committee 
following a restatement has no effect on the information content of earnings; however; 
much caution should be used regarding this analysis due to the small number of sample 
firms with data available to examine earnings response coefficients. (Tables are located 
in the appendix.) 
Analysis of Beta 
 
 Table 8 presents descriptive statistics on the systematic risk of restating firms 
prior to announcing a restatement and two years following the restatement 
announcement, as well as by audit committee composition decision for the same time 
period.  Panel A of Table 8 indicates that beta increases, in general, for firms following 
the announcement of a restatement, but this increase is not significantly different from 
zero.  Panels B and C of Table 8, likewise, indicate that beta increases for both groups of 
restating firms but not by a significant amount.  Based on the theory developed by 
Cloninger and Waller (2000), insignificant changes in beta following a restatement are 
indicative of “rotten apples” within the company; however, both groups of restating firms 
potentially suffer from this problem indicating an overall absence of additional 
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consequences to investors when a majority of directors are kept in place on the audit 
committee following a financial reporting failure. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
 Table 9 presents descriptive statistics on the changes in beta from prior to the 
restatement announcement to two years following the restatement announcement, as well 
as results from estimating equation (6) for all restatement firms with available data.  
Panel A of Table 9 indicates, consistent with Table 8, that differences in the change in 
beta between the two groups were not significantly different from zero; suggesting that 
no additional consequences are suffered based on the differential decisions regarding the 
composition of the audit committee following a restatement.  Panel A of Table 9 further 
indicates a lack of significant differences between the two groups of restating firms.  
Panel B of Table 9 indicates that the regression model is not significant (F=0.53, 
p=0.7112); once again suggesting that investors do not suffer additional negative 
consequences when a majority of the directors on the audit committee are kept in place.  
As with inferences regarding the information content of earnings, however, much caution 
should be used regarding this analysis due to the small number of sample items. (Tables 
are located in the appendix.) 
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V.  Additional Analysis 
A firm’s corporate governance atmosphere may influence the effectiveness with 
which the labor market for directors disciplines those audit committee members which 
have been deemed to have engaged in a financial reporting failure.  Beasley and Salterio 
(2001) and Klein (2002b) present evidence suggesting that boards of directors with 
stronger governance characteristics value knowledge, expertise, and independence on the 
audit committee, and DeFond et al. (2005) suggests that firms with stronger governance 
characteristics have incentives to make improvements to the audit committee.  As a 
result, I follow the methodology of DeFond et al. (2005) and develop dichotomous 
measures of eight governance characteristics for each sample firm and its corresponding 
matched firm, such that values of one indicate strong governance and values of zero 
indicate weak governance.  The governance characteristics are dichotomized as follows: 
Board Independence-Prior studies have indicated that greater independence of the 
board of directors is associated with stronger corporate governance [Beasley (1996), 
Beasley et al. (2000), and Dechow et al. (1996)].  Following DeFond et al. (2005), I code 
firms with a one (strong governance) if the percent of outsiders on the board of directors 
is greater than 60%. 
Board Size- Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) suggest that directors 
who serve on large boards generally lack the ability to work together and deal with 
complex information and are more easily controlled by the CEO.  Yermack (1996) 
further finds a negative relation between board size and firm value.  As a result, I follow 
DeFond et al. (2005) and code firms one (strong governance) if the size of the firm’s 
board is less than the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
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BOSS- Combining the duties of CEO and chairman of the board can interfere with 
the ability of the board to effectively carry out its duties.  The Conference Board (2003) 
indicates this overlap may be a problem and suggests as one of its specific best practices 
that firms separate the duties of CEO and chairman.  In addition, Beasley (1996) and 
Dunn (2004) provide evidence that combining the powers and authority of the CEO and 
chairman into one position increases the likelihood of financial statement fraud.  
Therefore, I code firms one (strong governance) if the positions of CEO and chairman of 
the board are separated, and zero otherwise. 
Management Involvement-Carcello et al. (2008a) indicate that management 
involvement in the nominating process is associated with a higher incidence of financial 
restatements.  Consequently, I code firms one (strong governance) if management is not 
involved in the nominating process, and zero otherwise. 
Compensation Committee Independence-The NYSE and NASD now require 
listed firms to have a completely independent compensation committee or its equivalent 
in place (NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 303A and NASD Manual Rule 4350).  
Such suggests that monitoring activities are improved when the compensation committee 
is completely independent.  As a result, I code firms one (strong governance) if the 
compensation committee contains only independent, outside directors, and zero 
otherwise. 
Audit Committee Independence-Klein (2002a) finds a negative association 
between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals, and Carcello and Neal 
(2003) indicate that more independent audit committees display greater effectiveness in 
shielding auditors from reparations following the issuance of a going concern opinion.  
 43
Abbott et al. (2004) also find a negative relation between audit committee independence 
and the incidence of restatements.  Bronson et al. (2007), however, suggest that the 
benefits of audit committee independence are realized only when the audit committee is 
completely independent.  Consequently, I code firms one (strong governance) if the audit 
committee is completely independent, and zero otherwise. 
Audit Committee Size-The NYSE and NASD require firms to have an audit 
committee consisting of at least three members (NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 
303A and NASD Manual Rule 4350).  Such suggests that management may easily 
influence audit committees of fewer than three members.  Likewise, large audit 
committees may face problems similar to those outlined by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) that 
large boards of directors encounter.  As a result, I code firms one (strong governance) if 
the audit committee contains either three or four members, and zero otherwise. 
Audit Committee Meetings-The Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999) recommended open and frequent 
communication between the external auditor and the audit committee as well as interim 
reviews of the financial statements.  As a result, audit committees have been viewed as 
being compliant with these recommendations if quarterly meeting of the committee 
members are held.  Abbot et al. (2004) presents evidence consistent with this, suggesting 
that firms have a lower incidence of a financial reporting failure when the audit 
committee meets at least four times annually.  Consequently, I code firms one (strong 
governance) if the audit committee surpasses the minimum requirement (four audit 
committee meetings annually) to comply with the BRC’s recommendations, and zero 
otherwise. 
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I then construct a summary measure by summing across the eight characteristics 
for each sample firm and its respective match and then create a dichotomous measure of 
the corporate governance environment based on the median of the summed values.  The 
dichotomous measure, thus, provides an indication of the relative strength of each firm’s 
governance environment and is used to examine the effects of the overriding governance 
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where  
STRONG_GOV = 1 if the firm has a relatively strong corporate governance 
environment, else 0; and all other variables are defined as above. 
Table 10 Panel A presents results from estimating equation (7) with standard 
errors corrected for clustering among firms.  The model is significant at the 0.01 level 
(Wald χ2=68.55) and has a Pseudo R2 of 10.53%.  Table 10 Panel B, then, presents the 
partial effect that each variable has on the response probability of remaining on the audit 
committee of each category of firms partitioned by the presence of a financial reporting 
failure and the relative strength of the corporate governance environment.  For restating 
firms with relatively weak governance environments, the results indicate that directors 
with direct ties to the CEO are significantly less likely to remain on the audit committee, 
while directors with greater amounts of stock ownership are significantly more likely to 
remain on the audit committee.  In addition, the directors of these firms are less likely to 
remain on the audit committee if the firm is in a highly litigious industry.  For restating 
firms with stronger corporate governance environments, the evidence suggests that 
directors identified as the audit committee financial expert are more likely to remain on 
the audit committee following the restatement.  Such evidence, consistent with prior 
results, suggests that issues of director independence, quality, and expertise, as well as 
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litigation risk influence audit committee composition following a restatement.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that similar issues affect audit committee composition at 
non-restating firms.  Overall, this evidence indicates the labor market for directors 
operates in an effective manner; valuing such characteristics as director independence 
and individual experience and expertise. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
Grouping firms based on whether or not the audit committee is substantially 
changed following a restatement may be arbitrary and may mask the consequences to 
shareholders of firms that make no changes to the composition of the audit committee 
following a restatement.  As a result, I re-evaluate all subsequent analyses grouping 
restating firms into those that made no changes to the composition of the audit committee 
and those that made some change to the composition of the audit committee.  Table 11 
presents descriptive statistics for sample firms based on this classification criteria.  These 
results indicate that firms retaining the audit committee in tact following a restatement 
have significantly fewer CEOs who also serve as the chairman of the board (45.2% vs. 
66.7%) and significantly fewer directors on the audit committee whose term began after 
that of the CEO (36.2% vs. 49.6%).  No other significant differences between the two 
groups of firms are indicated.  Overall, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 11 are 
consistent with prior analyses and suggest that changes in the composition of the audit 
committee were more likely to take place at firms where CEO authority and influence 
may have been perceived by the labor market to have impaired the effectiveness of the 
audit committee.  (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
Table 12 presents results of estimating equation (4) for both firms making no 
change in the composition of the audit committee and firms making any change in the 
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composition of the audit committee, as well as a comparison of the levels and changes in 
discretionary accruals for each group of firms.  Panel A of Table 12 indicates that the 
base OLS model for each group is significant at the 0.01 level and that, at least, 32% 
(R2=0.3281 and 0.6356) of the variation in discretionary accruals is explained by the 
variation in the independent variables.  Panel B of Table 12 indicates that firms making a 
change in the composition of their audit committee have accruals in each year that are 
significantly less than zero and that the difference between the level of accruals in year 2 
of firms making a change in the composition of the audit committee is significantly less 
than that of firms making no change in the composition of the audit committee.  Such, 
seemingly, indicates that firms making no change in the audit committee do so in order to 
capitalize on the monitoring ineffectiveness of the audit committee; however, a closer 
examination of the results indicates that much of this difference is due to the level of 
accruals in the year prior to the restatement announcement and that neither the level of 
accruals nor the changes in accruals for firms making no change in the composition of the 
audit committee is significantly different from zero.11  Consequently, these results 
present no evidence that firms making no change in the composition of the audit 
committee do so to engage in aggressive accounting practices.  Furthermore, these 
results, when coupled with those presented in Table 11, suggest that both the labor 
market for directors and the auditor effectively identify those firms where audit 
committee composition at the time of the restatement provided less than adequate 
protection to the interest of the shareholders.  Additional analyses using earnings 
                                                 
11 Compustat reports data items using restated information.  As a result, I hand collect non-restated data 
from the original 10-Ks filed with the SEC for those firms making a change in the composition of the audit 
committee and re-perform the analysis.  Results are qualitatively similar. 
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response coefficients and systematic risk (not reported), similar to prior analyses, fail to 
produce significant models, thereby, presenting no evidence that investors suffer any 
consequences as a result of retaining the entire audit committee following a restatement.   
Overall, these analyses suggest that the labor market for directors operates in an effective 
manner and that investors do not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of 
differential decisions concerning the composition of the audit committee following a 
restatement. (Tables are located in the appendix.) 
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VI.  Conclusions 
Prior research has indicated that outside directors face penalties from the labor 
market for such corporate failures as bankruptcy, allegations of fraud, and financial 
reporting failures [Gilson (1990), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), and Srinivasan (2005)]; 
however, the evidence presented in Agrawal et al. (1999), Srinivasan (2005), Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007), and Helland (2006) indicates that labor market penalties are not 
imposed uniformly across all directors following a reporting failure.  As a result, some 
have questioned whether the labor market for directors operates in an effective way 
[Richardson (2005) and Helland (2006)].  Such questions are supported by recent work, 
which suggests that inefficiencies in the determination of board composition can have 
adverse effects on the shareholders of a corporation [Carcello et al. (2008a)].  This, 
however, contradicts prior literature which has hypothesized that the labor market for 
directors operates in an efficient manner with shareholders using their voting rights to 
effectively determine the composition of the board of directors [Fama (1980) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983)].   
In order to examine whether inefficiencies exist in the labor market for directors, I 
collect information on the individual audit committee members of firms experiencing 
multiple restatements of the financial statements and non-restating firms matched on 
industry, size, and, when available, auditor, and test whether retention on the audit 
committee is either related to the quality of the director or to the influence of the CEO 
over the board of directors and the audit committee.  In addition, I investigate whether the 
investors of firms that retain at least a majority of the directors on the audit committee 
following a restatement experience adverse long-term consequences compared to firms 
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that remove at least a majority of the directors from the audit committee following a 
restatement by comparing the quality of accounting choices, the information content of 
earnings, and the systematic risk of each group of firms.  I find that individual audit 
committee members at restating firms do not experience a higher departure rate from the 
audit committee than do individual audit committee members at non-restating firms.  I 
also find that director quality and experience are positively related to continuance on the 
audit committee while CEO influence is negatively related to an individual’s retention on 
the audit committee.  I further find no evidence that investors of firms who retain a 
majority of their directors on the audit committee following a restatement experience 
negative long-term consequences compared to firms that remove a majority of the 
directors from the audit committee following a restatement.  These results suggest that 
the labor market for directors works in an efficient manner by correctly identifying audit 
committee members who possess the necessary experience and expertise to execute their 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation, as well as those audit committee 
members who may be either unduly influenced by the CEO of the firm or who may 
possess conflicts of interest. 
 Limitations of this study include the use of a sample that is relatively small in size 
and the potential for self-selection to determine the degree to which a firm is willing to 
alter the composition of the audit committee.  As a result of the size of the final sample, 
limitations are placed on the number and type of examinations that can be made, thereby 
restricting further theoretical development.  In addition, the loss of sample items due to 
data requirements in some analyses may lead to inferences that are misleading.  The use 
of firms that have experienced multiple reporting failures may also limit the 
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generalizability of the results due to the fact that most public firms have never 
experienced a financial reporting failure, much less multiple reporting failures.  
Furthermore, problems associated with self-selection may result from industry or other 
unobservable characteristics that lead to shareholders determining that the benefits that 
accrue as a result of a change in governance following a restatement are outweighed by 
the costs associated with such a change.  This study is also limited in that it assumes 
board composition decisions are determined by the market and exclude decisions 
regarding continuing service on the board and/or its committees made for other, non-
related reasons.  Finally, existing inefficiencies in the labor market for directors may be 
masked due to the changes in board composition initiated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 Currently, little is known about how the labor market for directors uses 
information to determine the composition of both boards of directors and the various 
committees of the board.  Future studies might further investigate this issue by 
broadening the examination to include other events that may convey information to the 
labor market and initiate the ex-post settling up process.  In addition, the effectiveness of 
the labor market’s disciplinary actions could be investigated by examining the 
characteristics of replacement directors.  Finally, an understanding of how the labor 
market for directors has changed subsequent to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
could lead to more effective regulations and recommendations concerning the process 
whereby board composition is determined and, thereby, more effective monitors of the 
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Table 1.  Sample Selection of Restating and Matching Firms 
 











Final Sample of Restating Firms 70
Firms with insufficient proxy data
Firms not listed on CRSP
Firms with insufficient data for match
Firms without a suitable match
Firms without any proxy data
All firms with negative income
adjusting restatement preceeded by
another restatement
Firms not listed on Compustat
 
 
Panel B:  SIC Digit Match 
 
SIC Digits Number of Percent of Cumulative 
Used in Match Firms Sample Percentage
4 36 51.43% 51.43%
3 11 15.71% 67.14%
2 13 18.57% 85.71%
1 10 14.29% 100.00%  
 
Panel C:  Assets (Millions) 
 
Variable Restate Non-Restate Difference p Value
Assets 3997.045 3961.364 35.681 0.978  
 
Panel D:  Auditor Match 
 
Matched on Number of Percent of 
Auditor Firms Sample
Yes 25 35.71%
No 45 64.29%  
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics by Restating and Non-Restating Firms 
 
Variable Restate Non-Restate Difference
Retention on the Audit Committee 0.742 0.777 -0.035
BOSS 0.571 0.543 0.029
CEO_FOUNDER 0.243 0.271 -0.029
CEO_INVOLVE_NC 0.157 0.200 -0.043
CEO_TIE 0.136 0.112 0.024
CEO_TENURE 6.257 7.786 -1.529
CEO_APT_BOD 0.436 0.422 0.014
SIZE 3997.045 3961.364 35.681
LITIGATION 0.514 0.529 -0.014
BOARD_SIZE 8.171 8.229 -0.057
PCT_OUTSIDE 0.612 0.625 -0.013
AGE 58.597 59.853 -1.255
TENURE 5.975 6.757 -0.782
FIN_EXPERT 0.356 0.311 0.045
OUTSIDE_CEO 0.182 0.155 0.027
DIR_OWN 0.003 0.009 -0.006 *
DIR_GAIN 0.119 0.143 -0.025  
 
_________________________ 
* Significant at the 0.10 level based on a two-tailed test. 
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Table 2, continued. 
 

















1 if the director is retained on the audit committee;
1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are combined;
1 if the CEO is the founder of the company or part of the
founding family;
1 if the CEO is involve in the nominating process;
1 if the audit committee member shares ties with the CEO
outside the board of the restating firm;
the number of concurrent years that the CEO has served in
that position at the time of the restatement;
1 if the audit committee member's tenure begins after that
of the CEO;
the natural log of the total assets of the firm;
1 if the firm is in a highly litigious industry [Hogan and
Jeter (1999)];
the number of directors on the board at the time of the
restatement;
the percentage of outside directors on the board at the
time of the restatement;
the age of the audit committee member;
the number of years the director has served on the board;
1 if the audit committee member is identified as the audit
committee financial expert at the time of the restatement;
1 if the audit committee member is the CEO at another
company;
announcement;
the percentage of the common stock owned by the audit
committee member at the time of the restatement;
1 if the audit committee member has a net gain of at least
one outside directorship following the restatement
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Table 3.  Probit Regression of Audit Committee Retention on Variables Indicative 
of the CEO’s Influence over the Audit Committee, Variables Indicative of the 
Quality of the Audit Committee Member, and Other Control Variables 
 






CEO_INVOLVE_NC -0.5284 -1.80 *
CEO_TIE -0.1585 -0.46
CEO_TENURE 0.0422 2.35 **
CEO_APT_BOD -0.4408 -2.03 **
SIZE -0.1199 -2.02 **
LITIGATION 0.0605 0.26




FIN_EXPERT 0.6254 2.65 ***
OUTSIDE_CEO 0.0132 0.05
DIR_OWN 1.6928 1.07





RESTATE*CEO_TENURE -0.0432 -1.70 *
RESTATE*CEO_APT_BOD 0.2024 0.62
RESTATE*SIZE 0.1637 1.73 *
RESTATE*LITIGATION -0.3606 -1.08










Wald χ 2 57.10
Prob >χ 2 0.0057
Pseudo R 2 0.1163
Dependent Variable:
Retention on the Audit Committee
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Table 3, continued. 
 
Panel B:  Cumulative Effect of Each Variable by Restatement Group 
 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
BOSS 0.1020 -0.4410 *
CEO_FOUNDER -0.1868 0.5163
CEO_INVOLVE_NC -0.5284 * -0.1276
CEO_TIE -0.1585 -0.5715 **
CEO_TENURE 0.0422 ** -0.0010
CEO_APT_BOD -0.4408 ** -0.2384
SIZE -0.1199 ** 0.0438
LITIGATION 0.0605 -0.3001




FIN_EXPERT 0.6254 *** 0.4223 **
OUTSIDE_CEO 0.0132 0.2135
DIR_OWN 1.6928 8.6176
DIR_GAIN 1.1740 *** 0.5539
Non-Restate Restate
Dependent Variable:




*,**,*** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3, continued. 
 
























one outside directorship following the restatement
1 if the audit committee member has a net gain of at least
committee financial expert at the time of the restatement;
founding family;
outside the board of the restating firm;
that position at the time of the restatement;
time of the restatement;
1 if the firm is in a highly litigious industry [Hogan and
the number of directors on the board at the time of the
the percentage of outside directors on the board at the
the natural log of the total assets of the firm;
the number of years the director has served on the board;
1 if the audit committee member is identified as the audit
1 if the audit committee member is the CEO at another
the percentage of the common stock owned by the audit
the age of the audit committee member;
1 if the firm experienced a restatement of the financial
1 if the director is retained on the audit committee;
1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are combined;
1 if the CEO is the founder of the company or part of the
1 if the CEO is involve in the nominating process;
1 if the audit committee member shares ties with the CEO
the number of concurrent years that the CEO has served in
1 if the audit committee member's tenure begins after that
committee member at the time of the restatement;
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Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for Accruals Analysis 
 
Panel A:  Control Variablesa 
 
Retain Majority Remove Majority
Variable of Audit Committee of Audit Committee Difference
SIZE 5.713 6.235 -0.522
M/B 1.783 1.134 0.649
DISTRESS -2.478 -3.201 0.723
OCF -0.035 0.087 -0.122
LEVERAGE 0.281 0.300 -0.019
BIG4 0.718 0.792 -0.074  
 






* Significant at the 0.10 level based on two-tailed tests. 
aThe values presented are the mean value for the control variables.  The control variables are defined as: 
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 to Year 0 to Year 1 to Year 2
Retain Majority
of Audit Committee 0.009 0.018 0.020 0.138 * 0.009 0.002 0.118
Remove Majority
of Audit Committee -0.009 -0.008 0.110 -0.066 0.001 0.118 -0.176
Difference 0.018 0.026 -0.090 0.204 0.007 -0.115 0.294
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total debt scaled by lagged total assets; and 
1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 firm.
the natural log of the market value of equity;
the market value of the firm scaled by the lagged book value of the firm;
Zmijewski's (1984) financial condition index;





Table 5.  Comparison of Financial Reporting Quality between Restating Companies 
Removing a Majority of Directors from the Audit Committee Following a 
Restatement Announcement and Restating Companies Maintaining a Majority of 
the Audit Committee in Place 
 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat
Intercept -0.0894 -0.93 -0.1620 -0.54
Dum 0,1,2 -0.0038 -0.05 -0.0042 -0.04
Dum 1,2 0.0107 0.14 0.0471 0.46
Dum 2 -0.0137 -0.18 -0.1406 -1.32
Size 0.0101 0.71 -0.0349 -1.41
M/B -0.0023 -0.22 0.0068 0.14
OCF -0.7482 -11.36 *** 0.3282 1.11
Distress -0.0412 -3.78 *** -0.1143 -1.90 *
Leverage 0.1064 0.87 0.1566 0.43
Big4 -0.1077 -1.30 -0.0629 -0.57
n 123 47
F Statistic 16.33 5.00
Prob. >F <0.01 <0.01
R 2 0.5654 0.5490
Retain Majority of AC Remove Majority of AC
 
 















Year 0 to Year 1
Year 1
Year 1 to Year 2
Announcement






*,*** Significant at the 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5, continued. 
 
DUM 0,1,2  =
DUM 1,2  =







total debt scaled by lagged total assets; and 
1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 firm.
the natural log of the market value of equity;
the market value of the firm scaled by the lagged book value of the firm;
Zmijewski's (1984) financial condition index;
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets
1 in the year of the restatement, the first year following the restatement, or the 
1 in either the first or second year following the restatement;
1 in the second year following the restatement;
second year following the restatement;
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Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for Analysis of Earnings Response Coefficients 
 
Mean Mean
Variable (N) (N) Difference
UE -0.038 * -0.043 0.005
(207) (63)
NONLINEAR -0.055 -0.047 -0.008
(207) (63)
M/B 2.800 * 1.919 *** 0.881
(203) (58)
BETA 1.169 *** 1.107 *** 0.063
(205) (63)
SIZE 7.435 *** 7.272 *** 0.163
(203) (58)









*,*** Significant at the 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 









the difference between actual reported earnings per share and the mean analyst 
forecast scaled by the closing stock price two days prior to the earnings
UE*|UE|;
announcement;
the market model beta of the firm;
the natural log of the market value of equity; and
the standard deviation of stock returns for the 25 days prior to the earnings
the market value of the firm scaled by the market value of the firm;
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Table 7.  Comparison of the Changes in the Information Content of Earnings 
between Restating Companies Removing a Majority of Directors from the Audit 
Committee Following a Restatement Announcement and Restating Companies 
Maintaining a Majority of the Audit Committee 
 
Sum of Coefficient 
Estimates
Quarter Prior to Restatement 0.264 0.279
Quarter 1 0.203 0.363
Quarter 2 0.337 0.183
Quarter 3 0.295 0.081
Quarter 4 0.176 + 0.954 * +
Quarter 5 0.344 0.294
Quarter 6 0.304 0.369
Quarter 7 0.224 0.144
Quarter 8 0.076 0.270
n 252
F Statistic 1.18










* Significant at the 0.10 level based on two-tailed tests. 





Table 8.  Comparison of Pre-Restatement and Post-Restatement Beta 
 
Panel A:  All Restating Firms 
 
Period Beta Difference t-Stat p-value N
Pre-Restatement 0.9584
Post-Restatement 1.1032 0.1448 1.2367 0.2189 108  
 
Panel B:  Restating Firms Maintaining a Majority of Directors on AC 
 
Period Beta Difference t-Stat p-value N
Pre-Restatement 0.9563
Post-Restatement 1.1133 0.1570 1.1202 0.2661 80  
 
Panel C:  Restating Firms Removing a Majority of Directors from AC 
 
Period Beta Difference t-Stat p-value N
Pre-Restatement 0.9647





Table 9.  Comparison of the Change in Beta between Restating Companies 
Removing a Majority of Directors from the Audit Committee Following a 
Restatement Announcement and Restating Companies Maintaining a Majority of 
the Audit Committee in Place 
 
Panel A:  Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Mean
Variable (N) (N) Difference
ΔBeta 0.157 0.110 0.047
(40) (14)
ΔLogEquity 0.477 *** 0.344 * 0.133
(37) (13)
ΔROA 0.037 * 0.057 * -0.020
(30) (10)































ΔSales = the change in net sales scalled by lagged total assets.
the change in beta over the sample period;
1 if the firm retains a majority of the audit committee in tact following the
the change in the log of the market equituy of the firm over the sample period;





Table 10.  Probit Regression of Audit Committee Retention on Variables Indicative 
of the CEO’s Influence over the Audit Committee, the Quality of the Firm’s 
Relative Governance Structure, Variables Indicative of the Quality of the Audit 
Committee Member, and Other Control Variables 
 








LITIGATION 0.6937 1.79 *
AGE -0.0459 -1.49
TENURE 0.0650 1.87 *







RESTATE*LITIGATION -1.6388 -2.98 ***
RESTATE*AGE -0.0070 -0.17
RESTATE*TENURE -0.0699 -1.39
RESTATE*FIN_EXPERT -1.2382 -1.97 **
RESTATE*OUTSIDE_CEO -0.1561 -0.24
RESTATE*DIR_OWN 94.0834 2.58











Retention on the Audit Committee
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RESTATE*STRONG_GOV*LITIGATION 1.5716 2.37 **
RESTATE*STRONG_GOV*AGE 0.0263 0.55
RESTATE*STRONG_GOV*TENURE 0.0897 1.51







Wald χ 2 68.55
Prob >χ 2 0.0079
Pseudo R 2 0.1053
Dependent Variable:
Retention on the Audit Committee
 
 
Panel B:  Cumulative Effect of Each Variable by Restatement Group 
 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
CEO_FOUNDER -0.7723 ** 0.1143 0.2476 0.4727
CEO_TIE -0.2375 -0.2030 -1.4420 *** -0.5022
CEO_TENURE 0.0111 0.0265 -0.0234 -0.0119
CEO_APT_BOD 0.1790 -0.5153 ** -0.0215 -0.4403
LITIGATION 0.6937 * -0.0327 -0.9451 ** -0.0998
AGE -0.0459 -0.0071 -0.0529 * 0.0122
TENURE 0.0650 * -0.0227 -0.0049 -0.0029
FIN_EXPERT 1.1551 ** 0.3795 -0.0830 0.7119 **
OUTSIDE_CEO 0.0409 0.0695 -0.1152 0.4407
DIR_OWN 14.6766 1.2114 108.7600 *** -1.0957
Restate Restate
Dependent Variable:  Retention on Audit Committee





*,**,*** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 10, continued. 
 



















the age of the audit committee member;
1 if the firm has a relatively strong corporate governance
1 if the firm experienced a restatement of the financial
1 if the director is retained on the audit committee;
1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are combined;
1 if the CEO is the founder of the company or part of the
1 if the CEO is involve in the nominating process;
1 if the audit committee member shares ties with the CEO
the number of concurrent years that the CEO has served in
1 if the audit committee member's tenure begins after that
committee member at the time of the restatement;
the number of years the director has served on the board;
1 if the audit committee member is identified as the audit
1 if the audit committee member is the CEO at another
the percentage of the common stock owned by the audit
founding family;
outside the board of the restating firm;
that position at the time of the restatement;
time of the restatement;
1 if the firm is in a highly litigious industry [Hogan and
the number of directors on the board at the time of the
the percentage of outside directors on the board at the








one outside directorship following the restatement
1 if the audit committee member has a net gain of at least
committee financial expert at the time of the restatement;
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Table 11.  Descriptive Statistics for Restating Firms Retaining Full Audit 
Committee and Restating Firms Removing at Least One Member from the Audit 
Committee 
 
Retain All Do Not Retain
Variable of AC All of AC Difference
BOSS 0.4516 0.6667 -0.215 *
CEO_FOUNDER 0.2903 0.2051 0.085
CEO_INVOLVE_NC 0.1290 0.1795 -0.050
CEO_TIE 0.1048 0.1603 -0.056
CEO_TENURE 5.1935 7.1026 -1.909
CEO_APT_BOD 0.3619 0.4962 -0.134 **
SIZE 4302.4350 3754.3000 548.135
LITIGATION 0.4839 0.5385 -0.055
BOARD_SIZE 7.9032 8.3846 -0.481
PCT_OUTSIDE 0.6419 0.5875 0.054
AGE 58.1619 58.9466 -0.785
TENURE 6.1905 5.8015 0.389
FIN_EXPERT 0.2952 0.2443 0.051
OUTSIDE_CEO 0.2000 0.1679 0.032
DIR_OWN 0.0034 0.0020 0.001
DIR_GAIN 0.1429 0.0992 0.044  
 
_________________________ 


















the number of concurrent years that the CEO has served in that
1 if the audit committee member's tenure begins after that of the CEO;
the natural log of the total assets of the firm;
1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are combined;
1 if the CEO is the founder of the company or part of the founding
1 if the CEO is involve in the nominating process;
the percentage of the common stock owned by the audit committee
1 if the firm is in a highly litigious industry [Hogan and Jeter(1999)];
the number of directors on the board at the time of the restatement;
the percentage of outside directors on the board at the time of the
the age of the audit committee member;
1 if the audit committee member is the CEO at another company;
1 if the audit committee member shares ties with the CEO outside
directorship following the restatement announcement.
1 if the audit committee member has a net gain of at least one outside
family;
the board of the restating firm;
position at the time of the restatement;
restatement;
financial expert at the time of the restatement;
member at the time of the restatement; and
the number of years the director has served on the board;
1 if the audit committee member is identified as the audit committee 
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Table 12.  Comparison of Financial Reporting Quality between Restating 
Companies that Retain All Directors on the Audit Committee Following a 
Restatement Announcement and Restating Companies that Remove at least One 
Director from the Audit Committee 
 
Panel A:  Regression Results 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat
Intercept -0.0243 -0.22 -0.5260 -2.61 **
Dum 0,1,2 -0.0127 -0.14 0.0184 0.20
Dum 1,2 0.0448 0.48 -0.0214 -0.24
Dum 2 0.0036 0.04 -0.0936 -1.03
Size 0.0046 0.27 -0.0258 -1.30
M/B -0.0008 -0.07 0.0327 0.73
OCF -0.7230 -10.56 *** -0.5664 -2.65 ***
Distress -0.0353 -3.10 *** -0.1919 -4.50 ***
Leverage -0.0564 -0.37 0.7872 3.17
Big4 -0.1086 -1.12 -0.1233 -1.26
n 87 83
F Statistic 14.92 3.96
Prob. >F <0.01 <0.01
R 2 0.6356 0.3281
Retain All of AC Do Not Retain All of AC
 
 




Year -1 -0.0243 -0.5260 ** 0.5017
Year -1 to Year 0 -0.0127 0.0184 -0.0311
Year 0 -0.0370 -0.5075 ** 0.4706
Year 0 to Year 1 0.0448 -0.0214 0.0662
Year 1 0.0078 -0.5289 ** 0.5367
Year 1 to Year 2 0.0036 -0.0936 0.0971




All of AC Difference
 
_________________________ 
*,**,*** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 12, continued. 
 
DUM 0,1,2  =
DUM 1,2  =







total debt scaled by lagged total assets; and 
1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 firm.
the natural log of the market value of equity;
the market value of the firm scaled by the lagged book value of the firm;
Zmijewski's (1984) financial condition index;
cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets
1 in the year of the restatement, the first year following the restatement, or the 
1 in either the first or second year following the restatement;
1 in the second year following the restatement;
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